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Unleashing Competition in EU Business Services 
Henk L.M. Kox 
No. 284, 24 September 2012 
n most EU member states, the business services industry has booked no productivity growth during the last two 
decades. The industry’s performance in the other member states was weaker than that of its US counterparts. 
Exploring what may be causing this productivity stagnation, this policy brief reports that weak competition has 
contributed to the continuing malaise in European business services. The study analyzed the persistence (over time) 
of firm-level inefficiencies. The evidence further suggests that competition between small firms and large firms in 
business  services  is  weak.  Markets  for  business  services  work  best  in  countries  with  flexible  regulation  on 
employment change and with low regulatory costs for firms that start up or close down a business. Countries that 
are more open to foreign competition perform better in terms of competitive selection and productivity.  
‘Business services’ is a catchword for a heterogeneous group of services industries. It includes not only professional 
services (accountancy, legal, engineering, marketing, tax and management consultancy, architects), but also IT, 
software  services,  technical  testing,  contract  research,  labour  search  services  (temporary  work,  headhunting), 
industrial cleaning and security services. Business services are mainly used as inputs by other firms. 
The policy simulations in this paper show that greater import openness strengthens competition in business services 
markets. The largest positive impact comes from lower regulatory barriers for growing and shrinking firms.  More 
particularly, competitive selection would be fostered by a reduction of administrative and regulatory costs related to 
labour contracts, bankruptcy and start-up requirements.  
A key element of the European Commission’s Europe-2020 strategy is the Single European Market for Services. 
Business services form one of the largest industries in Europe – and given its productivity stagnation, it deserves to 
be a priority target of the Europe-2020 strategy. Improving the way the business services market functions may have 
large positive knock-on effects for the EU economy.   
 
1.  Houston, we have a problem! 
Business  services  have  seen  impressive 
employment growth since the early 1990s, and the 
industry  nowadays  accounts  for  10-20%  of  total 
employment. In some countries, business services 
employ  more  people  than  manufacturing  does. 
About half of the business services industry has a 
knowledge-intensive  profile.  It makes significant 
contributions  to  innovation  and  to  the 
dissemination of ‘best-practice’ knowledge across 
industries and firms.  
Be that as it may, the business services industry in 
most  EU  countries  has  had  zero  productivity 
growth since 1980. Knowledge-intensive business 
services have fared no better than the rest.1 Table 1 
shows that the contribution of business services to 
productivity  growth  of  the  economy  as a  whole 
                                                   
1 Rubalcaba & Kox (2007: 81). 
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was  zero  (or  even  negative)  for  a  representative 
group  of  countries  –  despite  the  fact  that  the 
business services industry accounts for one-eighth 
to one-fifth of total production in these countries. 
Of  the  EU  countries,  only  the  UK  performed 
reasonably  well;  elsewhere,  the  results  were 
disappointing.2  The  poor  productivity 
performance  of  business  services  throughout 
Europe  appeared  to  explain  a  major  part  of  the 
EU’s productivity gap with the US. Timmer et al. 
(2011) show that between 1995 and 2005 business 
services  contributed  +0.7%  annually  to 
productivity  growth  in  US  commercial  services 
and −0.1% annually in the European Union.3  
Table 1. EU business services: Hardly contributed to 
aggregate productivity growth, 1992-2005  
Country  1992-1997 
% points per year 
1997-2005 
United States  0.1  0.7 
France  0.0  −0.1 
Germany  −0.2  −0.2 
The Netherlands  0.0  0.1 
United Kingdom  0.6  0.5 
Source: Antipa & de la Serve (2010). 
Some  disbelieving  people  have  offered  the 
suggestion  that  measurement  errors  explain  the 
productivity  stagnation  in  business  services. 
However,  the  methodology  of  measuring 
productivity  growth  hardly  differs  between  the 
countries in Table 1, and there is no hard evidence 
that different ways of measurement could explain 
the  differences  in  country  performance.4  Hence, 
the stagnation must have other causes. Two recent 
studies conclude that most of the productivity gap 
between the European business services industry 
and  its  US  counterpart  is  explained  by  the  total 
factor  productivity,  often  related  to  the 
functioning  of  markets  and  the  institutional 
environment.5  Our  findings  support  this 
diagnosis.  
                                                   
2 Since 2005, the productivity growth in business services 
has  further  deteriorated  in  several  countries.  In  the 
Netherlands  this  was −0.7%  annually  during  the period 
2006-09 (see Antony et al., 2012). 
3  See  similar  results  in  Antipa  &  de  la  Serve  (2010), 
O’Mahony et al. (2010) and O’Mahony & van Ark (2003). 
4  On  measurement  issues,  see  further  Pilat  (2007)  and 
Inklaar et al. (2008).  
5  While  labour  productivity  measures  how  efficiently 
labour  inputs  have  been  used  by  firms,  total  factor 
2.  How to detect malfunctioning 
markets? 
Weak  productivity  performance  by  firms  may 
have several causes, varying from reasons that are 
specific  to  a  particular  firm  to  factors  that  are 
embedded  in  the  structure  of  markets. 
Management  may  make  faulty  choices:  buying 
bad  inputs,  employing  the  wrong  workers, 
making  products  that  they  had  better  left  to 
others,  miscalculating  consumer  demand.  These 
things  happen  all  the  time,  but  they  cannot 
explain why a complete industry with more than 
15  million  workers  in  the  EU  has  been 
experiencing  stagnation  in  productivity  for  the 
past two decades.  
Is  something  wrong  with  business  services 
markets  across  Europe?  What  would  have 
happened  if  business  services  markets  had 
experienced full competition? In an industry with 
homogeneous  products  and  strong  competitive 
interaction,  firms  with  weak  productivity  and 
high costs would have been punished by a lower 
market share and low profits. Conversely, efficient 
firms would have grown much faster than others, 
and thus have ended up with a greater weight in 
this industry. Such market selection ensures that 
firms  cannot  be  careless  about  their  efficiency 
performance.6  As  a  first  diagnostic  tool,  we 
compare the actual developments in the business 
services markets with a hypothetical situation in 
which markets would have perfect selection. 
In  many  industries,  setting  up  production 
involves certain necessary fixed-cost expenditures 
–  for  offices,  computer  networks,  hiring  of 
personnel with specialised knowledge, setting up 
research capacity or outlay for sales campaigns. In 
firms with few employees and small sales, these 
fixed  costs  weigh  more  heavily  per  unit  sold. 
Consequently,  contrary  to  common  belief,  the 
smallest  firms  tend  to  be  the  most  capital-
intensive firms in terms of fixed production costs 
per worker. Figure 1 shows this to be true also for 
European business services. A large firm that sells 
more products will more quickly recover its fixed-
cost  investments  than  will  a  small  firm.  Size-
                                                                                       
productivity  can  measure  the  use-efficiency  of  all 
production  inputs in  a  wider  sense;  see  Antipa  &  de  la 
Serve (2010) and Timmer et al. (2011). 
6  The  background  study  (Kox  &  van  Leeuwen,  2012) 
demonstrates that this mechanism also works in markets 
where firms produce differentiated product varieties.  UNLEASHING COMPETITION IN EU BUSINESS SERVICES | 3 
 
related  efficiency  differences  thus  form  a 
competitive  advantage.  Per  unit  sold,  the  large 
firm has less fixed costs and makes more profit. If 
all  firms  compete  with  each  other,  such  size 
advantages  should  be  attractive  to  all  of  them, 
thus forming an incentive to grow.  
Figure 1. Smallest firms invest the most capital per worker, 2005 
 
Note: Smallest size class = 100. The graph gives industry averages for 13 EU countries. 
Industry  legend:  K72:  IT  and  computer  services;  K741:  Accountancy,  legal,  administrative  and  consultancy  services;  K742_3 
Architectural and engineering services; K744: Marketing services; K745: Labour recruitment services; K746: Industrial cleaning; 
K747: Security services; K748: Miscellaneous business services. 
Of course, the sky is not the limit with respect to 
scale  advantages.  Beyond  some  size  threshold, 
cost  disadvantages  occur  due  to  internal 
bureaucracy, diminished flexibility or to problems 
with  motivating  and  monitoring  employees. 
Mammoths  are  seldom  the  most  efficient  firms. 
The same holds for the smallest firms: not only are 
they  relatively  capital-intensive,  but  they  have 
also  few  benefits  of  labour  specialisation.  Their 
managers  constantly  have  to  switch  between  all 
kinds of tasks.7 Which size class is optimal differs 
by  industry.  In  a  competitive  market  we  expect 
that all firms try to achieve the optimal size, either 
by  growing  or  by  shrinking. Inefficient  small  or 
large  firms  would  ‘automatically’  lose  market 
share, have lower profits or go broke. Thus, after 
some adaptation period, only firms of optimal size 
would be left standing. 
The framework for assessing the effectiveness of 
market  selection  has  two  elements.  First,  it 
distinguishes firms by size class and ranks firms 
                                                   
7 Small firms can apply less internal division of labour and 
their employees are more involved in multi-tasking. This 
comes  with  some  productivity  disadvantages  as  shown 
earlier by Adam Smith, and more recently by Coviello et 
al. (2010).  
within  a  particular  size  class  by  their  efficiency. 
This is called X-efficiency. Second, it compares the 
best-performing firms in each size class with the 
best-performing  firms  in  the  most-efficient  size 
class.  The  latter  is  called  scale  efficiency;  it 
measures  efficiency  differences  that  are  scale-
related.  Taken  together,  our  approach  measures 
what happens with efficiency performance within 
a size class and between different size classes. This 
provides an indication of competitive interaction. 
Figure 2 shows a snapshot of a possible result at a 
given  moment.  It  compares two  cases.  Case  I  is 
our benchmark; it is a fictitious situation in which 
the  market  is  fully  competitive.  All  firms  have 
attained  optimal  size  Q  and  other  firms  have 
disappeared.  The  efficiency  of  the  optimal-sized 
firms  Q  is  represented  by  the  red  dashed  line.8  
Case II comes closer to the actual situation in the 
market: not all firms have achieved optimal firm 
size. Here, one finds firms of all size classes, larger 
and smaller than Q. The solid blue line describes 
the efficiency of the best-performing firms in each 
size class. 
                                                   
8  The  efficiency  index  is  based  on  the  average  costs  of 
optimum-sized firms; it includes variable and fixed costs. 
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Figure 2. Framework for analysing firm size, productivity and market selection 
 
 
The picture shows that even the best-performing 
firms  in  the  smallest  and  largest  size  classes  do 
worse than those in the most-efficient size class. 
The worst-performing firms in each size class are 
depicted by the green dot-dashed line. All firms 
operate between the solid blue line and the green 
dot-dashed line.  Figure 2 allows us to distinguish 
three deficiencies in competitive market selection:  
  Region  A  reflects  market  obstacles  (such  as 
commercial  set-up  costs,  or  regulatory  entry 
barriers) that impede firms growing towards 
size Q. There may also be post-entry growth 
barriers  (such  as  administrative  burdens,  tax 
obligations or labour laws) that contain size-
specific hurdles. 
  Region  B  reflects  obstacles  that  make 
shrinking to size Q less attractive. Such exit or 
shrinking barriers may stem from labour laws, 
bankruptcy laws or the tax system. The market 
power of the large firms could also diminish 
their need to operate at optimal size. 
  Area  C  covers  all  forms  of  competitive 
weakness  that  allow  sub-frontier  firms  to 
survive in shallow or non-transparent markets 
with weak competitive interaction (location in 
rural  areas,  no  import  competition,  product 
niche  markets).  Product-market  regulation 
that  protects  inefficient  incumbent  firms 
against new entrants may be another reason. 
Regions A and B of the graph have a clear relation 
to firm size; they are called scale-inefficiency.  The 
remaining inefficiencies have no clear relation to 
firm size; they are called X-inefficiency (depicted 
by  area  C).  In  a  perfectly  selecting  market,  the 
inefficiency  areas  A,  B  and  C  should  become 
smaller  over  time.  If  that  does  not  happen,  and 
inefficiencies  appear  to  be  persistent  over  time, 
then extra policy attention will be necessary. This 
warning device will now be applied to European 
business services. 
3.  EU business services: Weak 
competition  
When  asked  to  name  a  typical  business  service 
firm,  many  people  will  probably  mention  large 
firms  such  as  PriceWaterhouseCoopers,  Ernst  & 
Young  or  KPMG  in  accountancy,  consultancy 
firms like McKinsey or software giants like SAP 
and Microsoft. These large firms, however, are the 
exception  rather  than  the  rule.  Business services 
are  overwhelmingly  dominated  by  small  firms: 
93% of all firms in the 13 EU countries have fewer 
than 10 employees. The typical small firm has a 
local network of clients, often based on personal 
contacts.  Very  few  of  them  export  to  other 
countries.  
Table 2 shows which size class uses the smallest 
amount of labour and capital to produce one euro 
Efficiency index
Firm size
case I:   competitive market, only firms of optimal size Q
case II:  imperfect competition, most-efficient firms by size class
case II:  imperfect competition, least-efficient firms by size class
A
C
B
Q
1
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of value added.9 The group of firms with 50-249 
employees forms the most efficient size class (like 
the Q in Figure 2). That size is much larger than 
the size of the average business services firm in 
the EU, which only employs 5.6 people. Table 2 
shows that firms with 1-9 employees have a scale-
efficiency score of only 0.48, which is more than 
50% lower than the most-efficient size class.  If the 
large  mass  of  small  firms  with  such  low-scale 
efficiency  can  survive,  this  hints  at  weak 
competitive interaction between size classes. The 
table shows also that if the smallest firms would 
grow only one size class bigger (10-19 employees), 
their  scale-efficiency  gap  with  the  most-efficient 
size class would almost evaporate.  
Table 2. Scale efficiency and X-efficiency differ strongly 
between size classes 
Size class of 
firm 
(no. of persons 
employed) 
Scale efficiency 
between size 
classes 
(optimal size = 1) 
Average X-
efficiency 
within size class a 
(best practice = 1) 
 1–9   0.48  0.92 
 10–19   0.93   0.61 
 20–49   0.97   0.62 
 50–249  (most 
efficient)  0.99 b 
0.67 
 250+   0.98   0.81 
Note: The table provides the average scores per size class for 
13 EU countries and eight sectors of business services over 
the period 1999-2005. 
a Shows the average gap with the frontier firms of the same 
size class.  
b The most productive size class scores 0.99 rather than 1.00 – 
due to averaging across industries, countries and years. 
The  last  column  of  Table  2 shows  the  efficiency 
gaps  between  firms  within  each  size  class 
(corresponding with area C in Figure 2). For three 
size classes, the average score is just about 0.60. 
This says that firms within these size classes are 
on average almost 40% less efficient than the best-
performing firms in their own size class. Such a 
result hints at poor competitive selection. Finally, 
the last column also holds a ‘big surprise’: the X-
inefficiency for the smallest firms is only 8%. This 
                                                   
9  The  data  cover  eight  sub-sectors  with  five  firm-size 
classes in 13 EU member states during the period 1999 to 
2005. The countries in the sample are: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Ireland,  Italy,  the 
Netherlands,  Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden  and  the  United 
Kingdom. 
means  that  all  small  firms  tend  to  have  a  very 
similar input structure and efficiency.10  
Did the inefficiency gaps become wider or smaller 
in  the  years  between  1999  and  2005?  Figure  3 
shows what happened by industry, both for scale 
efficiency  and  for  X-efficiency.  If  the  number  of 
efficiency  improvers  in  an  industry  was  larger 
than  the  number  of  observations  with  falling 
efficiency, the figure is above 1. It is below 1 if the 
observations  with  falling  efficiency  formed  the 
majority.  In  markets  with  effective  competitive 
selection, the number should be above 1.  Using 
this  criterion,  only  two  sectors  of  EU  business 
services  experienced  an  improvement  of  both 
scale  efficiency  and  X-efficiency:  “miscellaneous 
business  services”  and  “IT/computer  services”. 
On  the  opposite  side,  three  large  sectors  of 
business services witnessed falling scores on both 
types  of  efficiency:  “accountancy,  legal, 
administrative  and  consultancy  services”, 
“architectural  and  engineering  services”  and 
“security  services”.  The  remaining  sectors  had 
mixed  scores.  Overall,  this  test  shows  a  gloomy 
result for dynamic market selection in European 
business services.  
Figure 4 shows that this result is not driven by just 
a  few  European  countries.  The  graph  is 
comparable to Figure 3. It presents the efficiency 
changes  by  country,  taking  together  the  eight 
sectors  of  business  services.  France  is  the  only 
country where both types of efficiency improved 
between  1999  and  2005,  in  the  ‘northeast’ 
quadrant  (I).  Most  EU  countries  are,  however, 
located in the ‘southwest’ quadrant (IV). For them, 
both X-efficiency and scale efficiency deteriorated 
during  1999-2005.  Five  countries  (UK,  Sweden, 
Spain,  Belgium  and  Austria)  with  mixed  results 
are  found  in  the  ‘northwest’  quadrant  (III).  For 
them, X-efficiency improved, but scale efficiency 
deteriorated.  Figure 4  shows  that  the  results  are 
not  driven  by  just  a  few  countries,  but  hold 
broadly across Europe. 
                                                   
10 Additional research shows that this result is not due to 
strong  competitive  interaction  within  the  smallest  size 
class. The distribution of X-efficiencies within the smallest 
size class did not show the pattern that one would expect 
in a very competitive sub-market (Kox & van Leeuwen, 
2012, Fig. 6).  6 | HENK L.M. KOX 
 
Figure 3. Efficiency change disappointing in most industries between 1999 and 2005 
 
Note: The graph depicts the change in scale- and X-efficiency between 1999 and 2005.  
Industry  codes:  K72:  IT  and  computer  services;  K741:  Accountancy,  legal,  administrative  and  consultancy  services;  K742_3 
Architectural and engineering services; K744: Marketing services; K745: Labour recruitment services; K746: Industrial cleaning; 
K747: Security services; K748: Miscellaneous business services 
. 
Figure 4. ... and the same held for most EU countries between 1999 and 2005 
 
Note: The graph depicts the change in scale- and X-efficiency between 1999 and 2005. 
Country codes: AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, DE: Germany, DK: Denmark, ES: Spain, FI: Finland, FR: France, IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, NL: 
Netherlands, PT: Portugal, SE: Sweden, UK: United Kingdom. 
A qualification must be made with regard to the 
results  obtained  thus  far.  The  competition 
‘warning  device’  used  here  works  best  in 
industries  where  product  prices  are  important, 
where products are more or less standardised or 
where firms sell product varieties that compete for 
the  same  customer  budget.  Such  conditions  are 
found  for  business  services  like  industrial 
cleaning,  or  routine  security,  administration, 
testing  and  marketing  services.  There  are  also 
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parts of business services with complex products, 
where quality and specialised knowledge matter, 
and  where  provider-client  interaction  is 
important. In such markets, the product price is 
not  among  the  first  reasons  for  which  a  client 
chooses  a  particular  service  provider.  Product 
differentiation has the double effect that it makes 
cost levels less comparable, while it also tends to 
strengthen  the  importance  of  information 
asymmetry between firms and clients. Search and 
switching costs for clients are often high.11  This 
type  of  market  structure  applies  in  parts  of  the 
worst-scoring  sectors  of  Figure  3:  the 
“accountancy,  legal,  administrative  and 
consultancy” and “architectural and engineering” 
services.   
Wrapping  up,  the  analysis  provides  evidence  of 
weakened market selection in European business 
services: a) the efficiency gaps within size classes 
remain large and b) efficiency differences between 
small  and  large  firms  tend  to  become  larger, 
which  hints  at  poor  competitive  interaction 
between  size  classes.  Efficiency  performance  has 
weakened  most  in  industries  with  specialised 
knowledge-intensive  services.  In  our  framework 
this  indicates  poor  competitive  selection  –  but 
given  the  degree  of  product  differentiation,  a 
more  detailed  study  is  required  before  reaching 
final conclusions.12 
4.  Factors that drive market selection 
The  literature  suggests  two  prime  suspects  for 
malfunctioning  market  selection:  insufficient 
outside  competition  and  overly  stringent 
regulation.13  Markets  are  called  ‘contestable’  if 
incumbent  firms  have  to  fear  potential  market 
entry by outsiders attracted by the profits earned 
in  a  particular  market.  The  threat  of  entry  by 
outsiders (such as domestic start-ups and foreign 
firms) imposes market discipline and self-restraint 
for  incumbent  firms.  The  question  is  whether 
regulatory  factors  and  a  lack  of  outside 
competition can indeed explain the persistence of 
                                                   
11  See  Baker  &  Miles  (2008),  CSES  (2001),  European 
Commission (2002), Fuchs & Garicano (2012), Kox (2002), 
Nahuis & Noailly (2005) and Rubalcaba & Kox (2007: ch. 
15).  
12  Due to data limitations, this paper is based on a 3-digit 
level  of  industry  detail  –  but  a  5-  or  6-digit  level  of 
industry detail would be preferable. 
13 See Arnold et al. (2006, 2008, 2011), Bourles et al. (2010) 
and Restuccia & Rogerson (2008). 
scale-related  inefficiencies  in  European  business 
services.  
Outside  competition  is  measured  by  import 
penetration  in  national  markets  for  business 
services and by domestic start-up ratios.14 Import 
penetration from other EU members appears to be 
weak  in  several  countries.  Ireland  and  France 
have,  respectively,  the  highest  (60%)  and  the 
lowest  (6%)  import  penetration  rate.  Import 
competition in the Irish market is therefore strong, 
whereas imports play a small role in France and 
several  other  large  EU  countries.    Country  size 
plays  a  role,  because  larger  countries  have  a 
bigger domestic supply of product varieties and 
more domestic providers to choose from – so that 
their firms are less inclined to buy from foreign 
suppliers.  
Regulation  is  the  other  suspect  for  explaining 
weak dynamic market selection. Regulation may 
hinder competitive selection in several ways:  
  By  creating  market-entry  barriers  –  such  as 
administrative  start-up  costs  for  new  firms 
and foreign market entrants; 
  By  creating  exit  barriers  that  deter  entry  or 
hinder  the  exit  of  inefficient  firms,  e.g. 
bankruptcy costs and labour laws that hamper 
downsizing  of  firms  if  that  be  required  by 
market conditions; 
  By creating obstacles to firm growth, such as 
size-related legal and administrative burdens, 
tax breaks or subsidy eligibility;15 and 
  By  creating  obstacles  to  import  competition, 
such as sunk costs for policy compliance and 
differences in national tax systems.16 
Figure 5 depicts the relative differences between 
the EU countries, with respect to three important 
regulatory  indices  and  import  penetration  in 
business services.  
                                                   
14 Actual start-up ratios and actual import penetration are 
used  as  proxies  for  potential  market  entry.  Import 
penetration  is  calculated  from  Eurostat  input/output 
tables  as  the  share  of  business  services  imports  in  total 
domestic  demand  for  business  services  (net of  exports). 
Start-up  ratios  measure  the  number  of  new  firms  as  a 
percentage of the total number of incumbent firms. 
15 Garicano et al. (2012), Bartelsman et al. (2012) and Guner 
et al. (2008) conclude that government restrictions on the 
size of  large  firms  or  policies  that  promote  small  firms, 
have a negative impact on productivity by distorting firm 
growth.  
16 For example, De Bruijn et al. (2008) and Adam & Smith 
(2011: Ch. 5-6). 8 | HENK L.M. KOX 
 
Figure 5. Large country differences in regulatory costs and import penetration, 2005 
 
Note: All variables are expressed as index numbers. 
Country codes: AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, DE: Germany, DK: Denmark, ES: Spain, FI: Finland, FR: France, IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, NL: 
Netherlands, PT: Portugal, SE: Sweden, UK: United Kingdom. 
Source and for further details: Kox & van Leeuwen (2012, annex). 
Econometric analysis shows that the environment 
variables of Figure 5 are important for explaining 
the  country  and  industry  patterns  of  scale-
efficiency  and  X-efficiencies  in  EU  business 
services.  Table  3  shows  the  main  calculation 
results:  by  what  percentage  would  efficiency 
change  if  the  environment  variable  increases  by 
10%? The first line, e.g., says that scale efficiency 
drops by 1.5% if regulatory start-up costs increase 
by  10%,  while  there  is no  effect  on  X-efficiency. 
Similarly,  10%  more  import  penetration  would 
have no effect on scale efficiency, but it raises X-
efficiency by on average 0.8%. 
Table 3. Market contestability and regulation explain 
the inefficiency patterns, 1999-2005  
A 10% increase in ..  gives a ..% change 
in scale efficiency 
gives a ..% change 
in X-efficiency 
Regulation-linked 
start-up costs 
− 1.5%  -- 
Regulation-induced 
labour inflexibility 
--  − 1.6% 
Regulation-induced 
exit costs 
--  − 2.2% 
Import penetration  --  + 0.8% 
Domestic start-up 
ratio 
--  -- 
Source and for further details: Kox & van Leeuwen (2012). This 
table reports only the main, statistically significant results. 
The results of Table 3 can also be used to calculate 
the potential effects of policies that would lower 
regulatory  costs  or  promote  greater  import 
openness. Two policy reform packages have been 
simulated.  In  Reform  Package  1,  the  countries 
lower  their  regulation  costs  and  increase  import 
openness  in  the  direction  of  the  ‘best-practice’ 
country.17 In Reform Package 2, all countries lower 
their regulation costs by 10% and increase import 
openness also by 10%.18  
Figure 6 shows that Reform Package 1 would raise 
the  business-services  efficiency  in  the 
Mediterranean  EU  countries  and  in  Austria  by 
between 5 and 7%. The largest effects arise from 
reducing  the  regulatory  labour  inflexibility  and 
from a reduction of regulation-induced exit costs 
(such as bankruptcy rules). 
                                                   
17 Reform Package 1 assumes a mild policy reform: each 
country diminishes 25% of its gap with the ‘best-practice’ 
country  (per  variable).  A  full  closure  of  the  gap  would 
make the effects four times larger.  
18  The  base  year  for  the  policy  simulations  is  2005.  For 
import  penetration  we  take  Finland  as  the  best-practice 
country  (26%  import  share  in  domestic  use),  because 
Ireland is too much of an outlier. The simulations show 
the effect of policy changes on total efficiency (equals scale 
efficiency times X-efficiency), taking into account the full 
regression results (only partly shown in Table 3). 
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Figure 6. Simulation of Reform Package 1:  
Countries lower regulation costs and increase import openness towards the level of the best-performing country 
 
 
Reform package 2 reflects a uniform reform shock, 
also  carried  out  by  the  best-practice  countries  – 
even  though  for  them  the  marginal  benefits  are 
likely to be smaller. Figure 7 illustrates how the 
impact of Reform Package 2 is also mostly driven 
by  the  changes  in  labour  inflexibility  and  exit 
costs. This type of regulation has more impact on 
dynamic  market  selection  than  does  import 
openness  and  start-up  rules  for  new  firms. 
Regulatory exit costs slow the exit or shrinking of 
inefficient  firms,  which  therefore  stay  longer  in 
their  market  ‘slots’  than  they  would  have  done 
otherwise. Labour adjustment costs are a growth 
barrier in good times and a shrinking barrier in 
bad times. In both cases they diminish the pace of 
dynamic  market  reallocation  towards  more 
efficient  firms.  Since  these  regulatory  policies 
often  are  not  industry-specific,  similar  economic 
benefits of these measures will also emerge from 
most other industries in a country. 
 
Figure 7. Simulation of Reform Package 2: 
10% less regulation costs, 10% more import openness 
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5.  Policies to unleash new competitive 
powers 
Business services is not ‘just another’ industry. It 
is large in terms of employment – but even more 
importantly,  it  provides  key  inputs  for  other 
European  industries.  Several  studies  show  that 
services  inputs  have  a  great  impact  on  the 
productivity,  innovation  and  competitiveness  of 
manufacturing  and  other  industries.19  Without 
productivity  growth,  business  services  tend  to 
become relatively expensive for the industries that 
consume  them.  Weak  competition  makes  profits 
and prices higher than they would be otherwise.20 
Business services typically account for 15-20% of 
the inputs used by firms, and this share is rising 
over time (see Figure 8). So, the stakes for future 
European economic growth and Europe’s external 
competitiveness are high.  
Three types of policies seem appropriate in terms 
of  stimulating  better  competition  and  markets 
selection  in  business  services:  a)  generic  pro-
competitive  policy  reforms;  b)  policies  that 
strengthen  the  role  of  the  internal  market  for 
services  in  the  EU  and  c)  specific  policies  that 
increase  market  transparency  and  lower  search 
costs  for  buyers  of  complex  business  services 
products.  Several  generic  policies  may  help  to 
unleash new competitive powers in the European 
market for business services: 
                                                   
19 See Bourles et al. (2010), Forlani (2010), Giovannetti et al. 
(2010), Nordås (2008), Rubalcaba & Kox (2007) and Arnold 
et al. (2006).  
20 The European Central Bank has compared profit rates 
across European industrial sectors and concludes: “[...] the 
services  sector  has  the  highest  profit  share  (the  ratio  of 
profits to nominal value added)” (Maurin et al., 2011). 
 
a)  Policies  that  bring  more  labour-market 
flexibility.  For  fast-growing  small  firms  it  is 
important  to  remain  flexible  in  testing  new 
markets,  products  and  competition  concepts. 
They  need  leeway  for  experimentation,  and 
this  would  be  greatly  facilitated  by  more 
hiring and firing flexibility. 
b)  Policies  to  remove  obstacles  to  the  exit  and 
shrinking of incumbents. A European initiative 
to  lower  the  costs  of  restarting  after  a 
bankruptcy  could  prove  helpful.  Similarly, 
initiatives that break up domain monopolies of 
certain  professions  or  business  services 
providers  may  generate  more  competition 
dynamics in some countries. 
c)  Policies that facilitate post-entry growth by small 
and  innovative  firms.  Small  and  innovative 
firms  may  face  size-related  hurdles  in  their 
administrative  burden,  in  taxes  or  in 
employment legislation that may easily impair 
their  growth.  Our  evidence  indicates  that  a 
lack  of  new  firms  is  no  longer  the  main 
obstacle for the competitive selection process 
(see Bartelsman et al., 2012). More attention is 
now  required  for  the  distortions  caused  by 
policies that are specific for certain firm sizes 
(see Garicano et al., 2012). 
 
Figure 8. Increasing input share of firms comes from business services 
. 
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The opening of the single market for services is a 
key  element  in  the  Europe2020  plans  of  the 
European  Commission  (European  Commission, 
2010). Especially in professional services there is a 
high density of national regulations that constitute 
major  barriers  to  cross-border  trade.  This  factor 
limits  market  contestability  in  those  industries 
where we found the largest indications for poor 
competitive selection. It is important to give way 
to foreign providers of these services. Research by 
the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis has projected that full implementation of 
the  Commission’s  original  Services  Directive 
proposals from 2004 could have had the effect of a 
large increase in intra-EU services trade, with an 
economic effect that would equal 1.5% of total EU 
GDP.21 One-third of these gains (0.5% of total EU 
GDP) was due to a particular mechanism in the 
2004  Services  Directive  proposals,  the  so-called 
country-of-origin principle (CoOP). This principle 
guaranteed  that  member  states  could  no  longer 
impose  their  own  regulatory  requirements  on 
service providers from other EU member states if 
these service providers had already complied with 
the  regulatory  requirements  in  their  country  of 
origin. Discussion in the European Parliament in 
2006  resulted  in  removing  the  CoOP  from  the 
Services  Directive.  Nowadays,  the  revised 
Services  Directive  of  2006  has  largely  been 
implemented,  and  member  state  governments 
have evaluated each other’s regulations to assess 
their impact on intra-EU services trade (European 
Commission,  2011,  2012).  The  results  of  this 
‘mutual evaluation’ effort show that the following 
national  regulatory  elements  are  still  hindering 
the EU single market in services:  
  Regulations  on  required  professional 
qualifications of services-providing personnel  
  Regulations  on  legal  form  of  the  services 
provider 
  Regulations  on  capital  ownership  of  the 
services provider 
  Regulations on required local insurance. 
The European Commission is now considering “a 
swift and more ambitious implementation of the 
Services Directive” (European Commission, 2012). 
A  possible  way  forward  is  to  reintroduce  the 
CoOP from the original 2004 Services Directive in 
order  to  remove  remaining  obstacles  to  foreign 
market  entry.  This  deepening  of  the  internal 
                                                   
21  See  Kox &  Lejour  (2006a,  2006b)  and  De  Bruijn  et  al. 
(2008). 
market for services will stimulate market selection 
in  business-services  markets,  remedying  the 
productivity  stagnation  through  more  market 
contestability. The resulting lower prices will have 
positive knock-on effects in other industries.  
Switching  costs  can  be  important  obstacles  to 
market  selection:  clients  face  substantial  search 
costs when looking for an alternative provider.22 
Especially  small-  and  medium-sized  clients  tend 
to  solve  this  dilemma  by  using  hearsay 
information  on  the  reputation  of  service 
providers. This necessarily leads to a geographical 
limitation  of  the  alternatives:  the  extent  of  the 
market  is  limited  by  the  geographical  reach  of 
local,  hearsay  business  reputations.  Additional 
research  is  required  to  assess,  industry-by-
industry and market-by-market, what keeps large 
firms  from  competing  with  less-efficient  small 
firms,  and  what  business  models  could  change 
this situation. More in general, market functioning 
can  probably  be  improved  by  policy  initiatives 
that reduce the search costs for small clients, e.g. 
by  voluntary,  administrative  quality  tests 
comparable to ISO certification.  
6.  Conclusion 
This  policy  brief  provided  research  results 
indicating  that  a  lack  of  competitive  selection 
contributes  to  the  productivity  stagnation  in 
European business services. Competition between 
small firms and large firms in business services is 
found to be weak. Inefficiencies also persist within 
size classes, which indicate a lack of competitive 
pressure. Markets for business services appear to 
work best in countries with flexible regulation on 
employment  changes,  and  with  low  regulatory 
costs  for  firms  that  start-up  or  close  down  a 
business. Countries with more openness to foreign 
competition  perform  better  in  terms  of 
competitive  selection  and  productivity.  Policy 
simulations  show  that  many  countries  can  do 
better than they do now – but the potential gains 
from  policy  reform  are  largest  in  the  EU 
Mediterranean  countries  and  Austria.  A 
strengthening  of  the  single  market  for  services 
will contribute to more competitive selection and 
better  productivity  performance  in  European 
business services.  Because of its large weight in 
the  inputs  of  other  industries,  the  business 
services industry should be a key industry in the 
Europe2020 strategy of the Commission. 
                                                   
22 See Fuchs & Garicano (2012). 12 | HENK L.M. KOX 
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